

## II.—Apollonius Dyscolus on Mood

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The thesis of this paper, based on a study of the comments concerning moods in Apollonius Dyscolus' *De Constructione* or *Syntax*,<sup>1</sup> is that his use of the term *psychikê diathesis*<sup>2</sup> has been misinterpreted by his successors, both ancient and modern.

<sup>1</sup> The Greek grammarians (except pseudo-Theodosius) are cited by page and line reference to *Grammatici Graeci* (Leipzig): Dionysius Thrax to Part 1, edited by Gustave Uhlig (1883); Apollonius (*De Constructione*) to Part 2, Vol. 2, edited by Gustave Uhlig (1910); Heliodorus and Stephanus to Part 3, edited by Alfred Hilgard (1901); Choeroboscus and Sophronius to Part 4, Vol. 2, edited by Alfred Hilgard (1894). Pseudo-Theodosius or Theodorus (on whom see below, note 82) is cited by page and line reference to the edition by Karl G. Goettling (Leipzig 1822) apud Skrzeczka 3.7 (see note 83); both Goettling and Skrzeczka call him Theodosius. Priscian is cited by page and line reference to *Grammatici Latini*, edited by Heinrich Keil (Leipzig), Vols. 2 and 3, edited by Martin Hertz (1855-9); all references are to Priscian 1 (= GLK 2), unless specifically designated Priscian 2 (= GLK 3). Other references are to be interpreted as follows. Bekker, *An.* = *Anecdota Graeca*, edited by Immanuel Bekker; 3 vols. (Berlin 1814-21). Bekker, *Ap.* = Apollonius, *De Constructione Orationis*, edited by Immanuel Bekker (Berlin 1817). Bennett = Charles E. Bennett, *Syntax of Early Latin*; 2 vols. (Boston 1910-4). Brugmann, KVG = Karl Brugmann, *Kurze vergleichende Grammatik der indogermanischen Sprachen*; 3 vols. (Strassburg 1902-4); also French translation of the foregoing, *Abrégé de grammaire comparée des langues indo-européennes*, translated by J. Bloch, A. Cuny, and A. Ernout (Paris 1905). Buttmann = *Des Apollonios Dyskolas Vier Bücher Über die Syntax*, translated by Alexander Buttmann (Berlin 1877). Dittmar = Armin Dittmar, *Studien zur lateinischen Moduslehre* (Leipzig 1897). Egger = E. Egger, *Apollonius Dyscole, Essai sur l'histoire des théories grammaticales dans l'antiquité* (Paris 1854). Hale = William Gardner Hale, *A Century of Metaphysical Syntax = Congress of Arts and Science, Universal Exposition, St. Louis, 1904* 3.191-202 (St. Louis 1906). Hofmann = Manu Leumann and Joh. Bapt. Hofmann, *Stolz-Schmalz lateinische Grammatik*; 5th edition (Munich 1928). Humbert = Jean Humbert, *Syntaxe grecque* (Paris 1945). Methner = R. Methner, *Die Grundbedeutungen und Gebrauchstypen der Modi im Griechischen* (Bromberg 1908). Schwyzer = Eduard Schwyzer, *Griechische Grammatik*; 2 vols.; 2nd vol. completed and edited by Albert Debrunner (Munich 1934-50). Skrzeczka = Rudolph Ferd. Leop. Skrzeczka, *Die Lehre des Apollonius Dyscolus vom Verbum*; 4 parts (Königsberg 1855-69). Slotty = Friedrich Slotty, *Der Gebrauch des Konjunktivs und Optativs in den griechischen Dialekten* (Göttingen 1915).

<sup>2</sup> Purely for practical reasons, I confine all use of Greek characters to the notes in this article, and in the text employ transliterations for single words and phrases, and translations or paraphrases for connected passages. In transliterations, I designate eta and omega by circumflex accents, in conformity with the TAPA style-sheet, though I should prefer macrons.

Nearly all modern discussions of the Greek and Latin moods or their Indo-European prototypes begin with a quotation or an adaptation or a translation of Apollonius' phrase, and regularly construe it as implying a distinction involving the mind or the soul. For instance, among grammarians we find that Brugmann renders it "Seelenstimmung" (*KVG* 2.578; translated "l'état d'âme" in the French version, 612), Methner "Verhalten der Seele" (74), Bennett "mental attitude" (1.145), Humbert (for the plural) "modalités de l'âme" (84). Sloty quotes it without translating it (6); and Hofmann seems to be translating it without quoting it, in his phrase "die geistige Haltung des Sprechenden" (565). Apollonius specialists treat the locution in the same way: among commentators, Skrzeczka has "die Affektion der Seele" (2.3 and 4.18), and Egger rings the changes, usually in the plural, on "la disposition de l'âme" and "l'état de l'âme" (147, 148, 149, 152, 155, 168, 169); while Buttmann in his translation of the *Syntax* several times has "das seelische Verhalten" (170, 186, 394).

The supposed psychological implications of the moods are particularly stressed by professed adherents of the so-called psychological method. I shall cite just two striking examples.

One of the earliest — and most extreme — of these was Dittmar, who on the basis of his extensive, and potentially useful but sadly misapplied, collection of examples, endeavors to prove that all indicatives are peaceful and all subjunctives are polemic.<sup>3</sup> In conclusion (328) he reiterates that in the study of the moods "die sprachlichen Erscheinungen" must be tested "mit psychologischem Auge," precisely because the moods are "der Ausfluss einer gewissen *psychikê diathesis*."

With far more sense Hale, in an interesting and important paper, protests against the influence of the philosophers on the study of the moods, and urges that "our first task to-day is to get rid of all this metaphysical inheritance, which belongs to an unscientific age,

<sup>3</sup> In the indicative there is "etwas Souveränes, Apodiktisches, zugleich etwas Ruhiges, Friedliches, Behagliches, Schlichtes, Gleichgiltiges"; it is "der Ausfluss der *aequa mens*, der seelischen Freiheit" (209). For the subjunctive he takes as starting-point the use of this mood in "Fragen des gereizten Widerspruchs," which according to him were especially popular with the Romans because they were "ein ehrliebendes, streitbares, skeptisches, konservatives Volk" possessing "ein empfindliches Ehrgefühl, eine leicht zu verletzenden Stolz" (79–80). Eventually he somehow proves, at least to his own satisfaction, that not only *these* subjunctives, but *all* subjunctives, are "polemisch."

and to study language directly by and for itself" (202). But unfortunately he does not really carry out this admirable aim, since for him the alternative to the metaphysical approach is the psychological approach; his objection is to "metaphysical and *wholly unpsychological* ways of looking at mood-syntax" (201; italics mine), and what he advocates is a return to the viewpoint of Apollonius, who saw in mood usage a *diathesis psychikê*,<sup>4</sup> translated by Hale "an attitude of mind" (192).

But if we actually study the text of Apollonius, it seems to me that the support which Dittmar and Hale find in this author for the methods advocated by them can simply not be discovered there, and furthermore that the various interpretations already quoted for the phrase *psychikê diathesis* will be seen to be without justification. I myself would translate it simply as "modal distinction" or "distinction as to mood." At times "mood" alone would suffice, but this might lead to certain inconveniences, since to Apollonius a mood is *enklisis*, and this is not completely interchangeable or coextensive with *psychikê diathesis*.

A given verb-form is an *enklisis*; it shows or possesses a *diathesis*. This difference is well brought out in an interesting passage in which Apollonius distinguishes between the use of the optative mood, and of the adverb *eithe* with the indicative mood, in the expression of a wish. "We must note," says Apollonius, "that the optative mood (*euktikê enklisis*) of verbs differs from the adverb in this, that verbs show the optative distinction (*euktikê diathesis*) along with the action involved" (351.8–10).<sup>5</sup>

Also, *enklisis* is a term of wider extension than *psychikê diathesis*. This is made particularly clear in 291.4, where the infinitive is specifically described as the *enklisis* lacking *psychikê diathesis*.<sup>6</sup>

Skrzeczka (3.4–5) holds that Apollonius has another term for "mood," *rhêma*, a word regularly used in the much broader sense of "verb." He cites as proof two passages from Apollonius. In the first of these (327.11–2),<sup>7</sup> Apollonius is protesting against those who would rule out infinitives from the category *tôn rhêmatôn*.

<sup>4</sup> So Hale. Apollonius appears always to use the reverse order of words.

<sup>5</sup> Χρή μέντοι νοεῖν ὡς διαφέρει ἡ ἐκ τῶν ῥημάτων εὐκτική ἐγκλισις τῆς ἐπιρρηματικῆς τῷ τὰ μὲν ῥήματα μετὰ τοῦ συνόντος πράγματος σημαίνειν τὴν εὐκτικὴν διάθεσιν.

<sup>6</sup> ψυχικῆς διαθέσεως ἡ ἐγκλισις ἀμοιρήσασα.

<sup>7</sup> Πῶς οὖν οὐ βλαίων τὸ τὰ συνεκτικώτατα τῶν ἀπάντων ῥημάτων περιγράφειν τῆς τῶν ῥημάτων ἐννόας; Note Uhlig's paraphrase (326): cum ratione igitur is pugnat, qui infinitivos ex verborum notione et classe eximit (italics mine).

It is quite enough for Apollonius' purpose to insist that an infinitive, unlike a participle, is a *verb* despite its lack of person and number and consequent lack of *psychikê diathesis*; once proved a *verb*, it automatically becomes an *enklisis*, for every verb falls into one or another of the *enkliseis*. In the second passage (375.4–7),<sup>8</sup> he is objecting to the name *distaktikê* which some apply instead of *hypotaktikê* to the subjunctive mood in such clauses as *ean graphô*, and protests against the practice of naming *rhêmata* after the conjunctions introducing them; here he could have used the word for “moods,” but surely the more general term “verbs” does just as well.

There could be little question as to the meaning of *enklisis*.<sup>9</sup> This term goes back at least to Dionysius Thrax, about three centuries earlier than Apollonius. According to Dionysius, there are eight modifications of the verb, one of which is *enklisis* (46.5–47.2);<sup>10</sup> and there are five *enkliseis*, indicative, imperative, optative,

<sup>8</sup> Καὶ εἰ ἀπὸ τῆς δυνάμεως τῶν συνδέσμων ἔοικεν τὰ ῥήματα ἀνάγεσθαι, οὐδὲν κωλίζει καὶ τὰς λοιπὰς ἐγκλίσεις μετατιθεσθαι τῆς ἰδίας κλήσεως, ἀναδεξαμένως τὴν ἐκ τῶν συνδέσμων δύναμιν. Again note Uhlig's paraphrase (375): ac si aptum est formas verbales nuncupari ex coniunctionum adiectarum sensu, nihil obstat, quin ceteri quoque modi propria sua nomina cum eis commutent, quae coniunctionum praemissarum sensui respondent (*italics mine*).

<sup>9</sup> Skrzeczka (3.5) does discuss whether Apollonius, besides using the term purely of a specific “Flexionsform” (*a mood*), also employs it, as later writers did, to denote “worin das Wesen des Modus bestehe” (*mood* in the abstract); he concludes — rightly in my opinion — that this is to be doubted. He believes that originally the word had a broader meaning than Apollonius gives it, signifying any verbal inflection. Schwyzler (1.416; note 1) holds an exactly opposite view: that *enklisis* originally meant “mood,” and “erst spät” came to denote inflection in general, not only of verbs but of nouns as well. The Latin term corresponding to *enklisis*, *declinatio*, also was applied by the earliest Roman grammarians — who were of course following the Greek ones — to nouns and verbs alike (as in Priscian 442.18 coniugatio est consequens verborum declinatio), although ultimately, from Donatus on, the term was restricted to one part of speech — in this case to nouns. See on these various expressions Schwyzler 1.416, note 1; 2.53 and 302. The basis for this terminology is the conception of a single special *Grundform* as starting-point for the paradigm, with the other forms representing descents or deviations therefrom. The figure is based on the notion of slanting in *enklisis* and *declinatio* (whence French *déclinaison*, German *Deklination*, English *declension*), and on that of bending in Latin *flectio* (whence French *flexion* and *inflexion*, German *Flexion*, English *inflection*), for the whole system of declension or conjugation. Again for the notion of “cases” we have Greek *kliseis* and *plagiai* “slants,” and, by still another figure, *ptôseis* “falls” or “drops,” which last was the model for Latin *casus*, with the combination of falling and slanting in *ptôseis plagiai* and *casus obliqui*; whence came the analogically but illogically constructed *ptôsis orthê* (also called *eulheia*) and *casus rectus* for the starting-point or nominative-vocative, of course strictly not a *ptôsis* or *casus* at all.

<sup>10</sup> Παρέπεται δὲ τῷ ῥήματι ὀκτώ, ἐγκλίσεις, διαθέσεις, εἶδη, σχήματα, ἀριθμοί, πρόσωπα, χρόνοι, συζυγίαι. One codex gives a different order: διαθέσεις, χρόνος, ἐγκλίσεις, εἶδος,

subjunctive, and infinitive (47.3–4).<sup>11</sup> One of the scholiasts on Dionysius, Stephanus, lists the five *enkliseis* among various distinctions of verbs and, seemingly parallel to them in number, of nouns (246.27–8):<sup>12</sup> there are three voices, as there are also three genders; and five moods, as there are also five cases.

Despite the fact that Dionysius, author of the first systematic treatise on Greek grammar, and Apollonius, founder of the scientific study of Greek syntax and *grammaticorum princeps*, as Priscian calls him, used *enklisis* for “mood,” Choeroboscus — who frequently shows himself none too dependable a witness — tells us that the early grammarians called both the moods (*enkliseis*) and the voices (*diatheseis*) by the single term *diatheseis*, and then afterwards distinguished these *diatheseis* as of two kinds, designating the mental ones (*psychikas*) as *enkliseis*, and the physical ones (*sômatikas*) as *diatheseis* (5.4–7)<sup>13</sup> — thus representing the technical term *enklisis* as a later subdivision of the technical term *diathesis*.

Choeroboscus is guilty of other inaccuracies here in addition to his mistake about *enklisis*. So far as *diathesis* goes, this too the earliest grammarian uses just as do the later ones according to Choeroboscus. To Dionysius *diathesis* is definitely “voice” and not “mood.” He lists it as parallel to *enklisis* among the modifications of the verb, as we have already seen;<sup>14</sup> and he tells us that there are three *diatheseis*, active, passive, and middle (48.1).<sup>15</sup>

σχήμα, συζυγία, πρόσωπον, ἀριθμός. This is followed by Priscian (369.16–7): Verbo accidunt octo: significatio sive genus, tempus, modus, species, figura, coniugatio, et persona cum numero, quando affectus animi definit. Here *modus* represents *enklisis*, and *genus* represents *diathesis*. (To the final clause, which stems from Apollonius rather than from Dionysius, I shall revert later; see note 90.)

<sup>11</sup> Ἐγκλίσεις μὲν οὖν εἰσι πέντε, ὀριστική, προστακτική, εὐκτική, ὑποτακτική, ἀπαρέμ-  
φατος.

Apollonius recognizes all five of these, plus a sixth, the *hypothetikê* or “adhortative,” employed in the first person as the imperative is in the second and third (361.7–11 and 364.8–365.4); this is really the subjunctive used in a hortatory sense, but cannot be accepted as such by Apollonius, since he views the latter mood as restricted to its use in subordinate clauses (whence its name *hypotaktikê*; see especially 377.5–7). Later grammarians, such as Choeroboscus and Theodorus, recognize only four moods, since they exclude the infinitive; cf. notes 65, 66, 84, and 85.

<sup>12</sup> Τρεῖς δὲ εἰσιν αἱ διαθέσεις, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τρία γένη ὀνομάτων, καὶ πέντε ἐγκλίσεις, ἐπειδὴ καὶ πέντε πτώσεις.

<sup>13</sup> Ἰστέον δὲ ὅτι τὰς ἐγκλίσεις οἱ παλαιοὶ καὶ τὰς διαθέσεις κοινῶς ἐκάλουν διαθέσεις, καὶ λοιπὸν ὕστερον διεμέρισαν, καὶ τὰς μὲν ψυχικὰς ἐκάλεσαν ἐγκλίσεις, τὰς δὲ σωματικὰς διαθέσεις.

<sup>14</sup> See note 10.

<sup>15</sup> Διαθέσεις εἰσὶ τρεῖς, ἐνέργεια, πάθος, μεσότης.

Apollonius' usage is vague as compared with that of Dionysius. It is true that in his writings we meet *diathesis* in contexts referring to *both* voice and mood, but I think never in either case is this meaning conveyed by *diathesis*, as Choeroboscus implies. Indeed I doubt whether in Apollonius *diathesis* by itself ever has a technical meaning at all. It is rather a colorless word which, chameleon-like, acquires color from its surroundings. Its precise interpretation depends on the context; and its general meaning, "distinction" or "notion" or the like, gets a more specific denotation only when it is accompanied by some modifier that more narrowly defines its application. When that modifier is a grammatical term, the resultant phrase serves as a technical expression (which *diathesis* by no means constitutes by itself), such as "mood" or "voice." Nor under these circumstances is its application limited to "mood" or "voice"; it can apply to tense as well.<sup>16</sup> A *chronikê diathesis* (354.11-2)<sup>17</sup> is "a distinction of time or tense," equivalent to *chronos* "a tense," just as *psychikê diathesis* is "a distinction of mood," similar (though not quite equivalent) to *enkklisis* "a mood," as we have seen. But even with grammatical terms, *diathesis* does not *always* enter into a technical phrase; thus in his discussion of imperatives *tên tou mellontos diathesin* (96.10-1)<sup>18</sup> is not "the distinction of the future" in the sense of "the future tense," but simply "the notion of futurity," precisely like *tên tou mellontos ennoian* just below (97.5), and in opposition to *mellontos chronou* (*ib.* 4-5), which means specifically "future tense," the point in this latter

<sup>16</sup> Cf. Uhlig on Apollonius 96.11.

<sup>17</sup> Ἡδὴ μέντοι καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐγγινομένης χρονικῆς διαθέσεως ἐν τῇ ἐγκλίσει [sc. εὐκτικῇ] διαποροῦσί τινες.

My unknown coadjutor the referee, for whose careful and helpful suggestions I am very grateful, even though I have not accepted all of them, comments on this as follows: "Granted that *chronos* and *chronikê diathesis* are synonymous in Apollonius, we would expect *enkklitikê* rather than *psychikê diathesis*." I would suggest that *enkklitikê* was ruled out for this purpose as a result of being preempted in an altogether different sense, derived from the notion of "leaning" on the preceding word and not of "sloping" down from the first form of the paradigm: to wit "enclitic" as it is still used today. This was a fixed technical term with a fixed technical meaning (in opposition to *orthotonoumenê*), having to do with pronunciation and not with syntax. Apollonius uses it repeatedly, and always in precisely the same meaning; see, e.g., 22.3, 133.12, 167.10, 168.3, 180.5, 183.10, 437.9, and, for the adverb *enkklitikôs*, 314.10. The noun *enkklisis* also occasionally occurs in the corresponding sense (see, e.g., 167.12, 180.6, 184.4, 192.6); but in this usage it is much less common than the adjective *enkklitikê*, and not so definitely a specialized technical term, so that this usage did not interfere with its usual one in the sense of "mood."

<sup>18</sup> ἅπαντα τὰ προστακτικὰ ἐγκειμένην ἔχει τὴν τοῦ μέλλοντος διάθεσιν.

passage (97.3–5)<sup>19</sup> being that all imperatives have future force, and so none of them are in the future tense.

On the other hand, in combination with the adjectives *energêtikê* and *pathêtikê*, *diathesis* seems regularly used in a technical sense — “active distinction or notion,” “passive distinction or notion.” In such cases we of course can, and usually should, translate rather “active voice,” “passive voice”; but this emphatically does not mean that with the adjective removed, *diathesis* still = “voice.”

Thus Apollonius begins his discussion of the verb in general by enumerating the main topics to be studied, of which the first three are (319.5–8).<sup>20</sup> (1) the moods (*enkliseis*), (2) the tenses (*chronoi*), and (3) voice, active or passive, and middle (*diathesis*, *energêtikê ousa ê pathêtikê, kai hê . . . mesê*). It is noteworthy that he does not have to list the different moods or tenses to give *enkliseis* or *chronoi* a meaning, but he does have to define *diathesis*.

Again, he begins his discussion of voice by saying that we must now take up the distinction (*diatheseôs*) that is present in every mood, including even the infinitive, because of the necessity of expressing all action “either actively or passively or ‘middle-ly’” (394.7–395.2).<sup>21</sup> Here the end of his sentence makes absolutely clear that the distinction which he has in mind is one of voice; but it is only the three adverbs that prove this.<sup>22</sup> A little later, in inquiring whether all verbs have the distinction of voice, he says specifically *diathesin energêtikên ê pathêtikên* (395.8); and he frequently uses similar phraseology elsewhere.<sup>23</sup>

But what of Choeroboscus’ statement that when the *diatheseis* of the older writers eventually came to be divided, the *psychikai diatheseis* were called *enkliseis* and the *sômatikai* were called *diatheseis*? Since the older writers did distinguish mood and voice, and since at least their leading representative, Apollonius, did use *psychikê diathesis* more or less in the sense of “mood,” the implication

<sup>19</sup> Πῶς οὖν οὐ γελοίοι εἰσιν οἱ ὑπολαμβάνοντες ῥήματα προστακτικά μέλλοντος χρόνου, ὅπου γε πάντα συνωθεῖται εἰς τὴν τοῦ μέλλοντος ἔννοιαν;

<sup>20</sup> 1. αἱ τε γὰρ παρεπόμεναι ἐγκλίσεις λόγον ἀπαιτήσουσι τῆς συντάξεως, καὶ 2. οἱ ἐν αὐταῖς ἀναμερισθέντες χρόνοι, καὶ 3. ἡ συμπαραπομπὴ διάθεσις, ἐνεργητικὴ οὐσα ἢ παθητικὴ, καὶ ἡ μεταξὺ τούτων πεπτωκυῖα μέση, οὐ προσχωροῦσα οὐδετέρῃ.

<sup>21</sup> Ἀκόλουθόν ἐστιν διαλαβεῖν καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐγγινομένης διαθέσεως καθ’ ἐκάστην ἐγκλισιν, ἥς οὐδὲ τὰ ἀπαρέμφата ἐκτὸς ἐγένετο διὰ τὸ κατηναγκασμένον τοῦ συνέπεσθαι ἀπασιν τοῖς χρόνοις ἢ ἐνεργητικῶς ἢ παθητικῶς ἢ καὶ ἔτι μέσως.

<sup>22</sup> Another passage where *diathesis* gets the meaning “voice” from the context, 321.2–5, is quoted in note 55. See note 54.

<sup>23</sup> Cf., e.g., 325.13–4, quoted in note 50.

would be that he also used *sômatikê diathesis* in the sense of "voice." But this is as erroneous as the rest of the Choeroboscus passage.

Skrzeczka (2.4) thinks Choeroboscus designates *diatheseis* in the sense of "voices" as *sômatikai* because of a passage in Apollonius in which the kindred verb *diatithêmi* is brought into contact with *sôma* and *sômata*. It is true that *diatithêmi* in its active and passive voices actually specifies activity and passivity respectively: for instance, when Apollonius (237.8-9)<sup>24</sup> describes the reflexive pronoun as referring at once to the person that *acts* and the person that *is acted upon*, he uses for the first *to diatithen* and for the second *to diatithemenon*.<sup>25</sup> But when, in the passage referred to by Skrzeczka, on the relative position of noun and verb (18.5-8),<sup>26</sup> he says that to act (*diatithenai*) and to be acted upon (*diatithesthai*) is the property of the *sôma*, and the indication of this distinction, i.e., activity (*hê energeia*) and passivity (*to pathos*), is the property of verbs, he is using *sôma* not in the sense of "body" as opposed to "mind" or "soul" (as Skrzeczka seems to think), but simply as the fundamental essence of the noun itself, the *substantive*. Priscian, who follows this passage very closely (2.116.25-7),<sup>27</sup> renders *sômatos* by *substantiae*. We certainly must not think of a literal part of a person as implied by *sôma* here any more than by *psychê* elsewhere.

As for the combination of the noun *diathesis* with the adjective *sômatikê* which, according to the obvious implication of the passage in Choeroboscus, constitutes a technical phrase meaning "voice" just as the combination of the noun *diathesis* with the adjective *psychikê* constitutes a technical phrase meaning "mood," it is a fact that Apollonius employs *sômatikê diathesis* as a parallel for *psychikê diathesis*, but never, so far as I know, in a technical sense.

The use of this phrase (397.6-8)<sup>28</sup> to refer to verbs denoting *physical state* such as *kopiô* (occurring in a discussion of verbs which, having a passive meaning in the active voice, cannot form a passive),

<sup>24</sup> Ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἐν πρόσωπον τὸ διατιθὲν καὶ τὸ διατιθέμενον, μία καὶ ἡ φωνὴ κατὰ σύνθεσιν ἐγένετο.

<sup>25</sup> For other examples see Skrzeczka 2.4.

<sup>26</sup> Καὶ τοῦ ῥήματος δὲ ἀναγκαίως πρόκειται τὸ ὄνομα, ἐπεὶ τὸ διατιθέναι καὶ τὸ διατιθέσθαι σώματος ἴδιον, τοῖς δὲ σώμασιν ἐπίκειται ἡ θέσις τῶν ὀνομάτων, ἐξ ὧν ἡ ἰδιότης τοῦ ῥήματος, λέγω τὴν ἐνέργειαν καὶ τὸ πάθος.

<sup>27</sup> Ante verbum quoque necessario ponitur nomen, quia agere et pati substantiae est proprium, in qua est positio nominum, ex quibus proprietas verbi, id est actio et passio, nascitur.

<sup>28</sup> Ἔστιν δὲ καὶ ψυχικὴν ἢ σωματικὴν διάθεσιν σημαίνει, οἷς οὐ προσγίνεται πάλιν ἡ παθητικὴ κλίσις διὰ τὸ ἐν τῇ προσοῇ καταλήξει τὸ πάθος ὑπαγορεύεσθαι.



and later its use (405.16-7)<sup>29</sup> to refer to verbs denoting *physical action* such as *tribō* (occurring in a discussion of verbs which govern the accusative), is quite different. In both these instances *diathesis* is not a technical term used in grammatical nomenclature; it merely refers to the *meaning* of the verb. And in neither case is there any essential dichotomy between *sōmatikē diathesis* and *psychikē diathesis*: on the contrary, in the first passage the two are used as indifferent alternatives joined by *ē* (= "vel," not "aut"); and the second follows a general statement that verbs of physical and mental action take one and the same construction (405.12-4),<sup>30</sup> and is itself followed not only by a list of verbs used in the sense of mental *diathesis* (408.1-2),<sup>31</sup> such as *oiomai*, but also by a list of verbs used *both* physically *and* mentally (406.3-4),<sup>32</sup> such as *hybrizō*.

But precisely what does Apollonius mean when he uses *psychikē diathesis* in a *technical* sense? It is a strictly grammatical term denoting something that is possessed, along with person and number, by verbs, but not by infinitives or participles (320.4-321.2).<sup>33</sup> Its particularly close connection with person and number is made manifest by Apollonius' definition of a verb as quoted by Heliodorus (71.24-7),<sup>34</sup> a quotation usually regarded as probably accurate. "He (Apollonius) says: a verb is a part of speech with its own special forms, showing different tenses together with activity or passivity, and presenting persons and numbers when it also shows mood." Probably Apollonius has two reasons for setting tense and voice on the one hand apart from person, number, and mood on the other.

<sup>29</sup> Εἰσὶ μὲν γὰρ σωματικαὶ διαθέσεις αἱ τοιαῦται, τρίζω σε (κτλ.).

<sup>30</sup> Ἡ δὲ προκειμένη σύνταξις, κἂν σωματικῶς τὰ τῆς ἐνεργείας σημαίνῃ κἂν ἔτι ψυχικῶς, ὡς εἵπομεν, μίᾱς καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς συντάξεως ἔχεται.

<sup>31</sup> Καὶ ὅσαι ἐν ὑπονοίᾳ εἰσὶν ψυχικῆς διαθέσεως, συντείνουσιν ἐπὶ τι, οἴομαι σε (κτλ.).

<sup>32</sup> Καὶ σωματικῶς καὶ ψυχικῶς ὑβρίζω· καὶ γὰρ καὶ διὰ χειρῶν καὶ ψυχικῆς διαθέσεως.

<sup>33</sup> Τοῖς ῥήμασιν ἐξαιρετός παρέπεται ἡ ψυχικὴ διάθεσις, ὅπερ οὐ σύνεστι τοῖς ἀπαρεμφάτοις, καὶ τὸ ἐν ἀριθμοῖς καὶ προσώποις καταγίνεσθαι, ὧν τῆς διαφορᾶς οὐκ ἔτυχεν τὸ ἀπαρέμφατον, καθὼ καὶ ἡ ἐξ αὐτῶν μεταληφθεῖσα μετοχὴ στέρουμένη τῶν προκειμένων καὶ τῆς τῶν ῥημάτων ἰδέας ἀπεβλήθη.

This passage, though put into the mouths of a group of persons whose views Apollonius is refuting, none the less represents his own opinion too. He is combating not his adversaries' premises (that the infinitive and the participle alike lack certain attributes of finite verbs), but their conclusions (that, since the participle, lacking these attributes, is not a verb, therefore the infinitive is not a verb either, but is an adverb). See further below, note 53.

<sup>34</sup> Λέγει γὰρ οὕτως· ῥῆμά ἐστι μέρος λόγου ἐν ἰδίοις μετασχηματισμοῖς διαφόρων χρόνων ἐπιδεκτικὸν μετ' ἐνεργείας ἢ πάθους, προσώπων τε καὶ ἀριθμῶν παραστατικόν, ὅτε καὶ τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς διαθέσεις δηλοῖ.

In the first place in finite verbs there were marked and obvious differences for tense, including primary vs. secondary endings, presence or absence of an augment, the sigmatic element that so often marked the future, etc.;<sup>35</sup> and also for voice, with a completely different set of endings for the active vs. the medio-passive. But mood-signs must have often seemed quite inseparable from personal endings (which Apollonius was surely in no position to analyze scientifically); thus *-ei* must have seemed to him to mark at once third person, singular number, and indicative mood, and *-ô* to mark at once first person, singular number, and either indicative or subjunctive mood. And in the second place, infinitives possessed tense and voice just as did finite forms, but lacked person, number, and mood (*psychikê diathesis*). Indeed, Heliodorus seems to think that Apollonius worded his definition in this way precisely so that he might include the infinitive under the head of the verb; apparently the scholiast feels Apollonius wished to take cognizance of the fact that a verb might be expected to show person and number as well as tense and voice, but by specifying that it shows person and number (only) when it shows mood as well, he manages to include these items as frequent characteristics of verbs but not as essential properties. Heliodorus' comment (to which I shall revert later in another connection<sup>36</sup>) is (72.10-2).<sup>37</sup> "he says furthermore that the verb shows persons and numbers, not always however, but when it also shows mood . . . , in order that he may include infinitives too."

In regard to the infinitive, Apollonius' statements that it is an *enkklisis* without modal distinction (291.4), and that it lacks modal distinction (320.4-5) and number and person (320.5-6), have already been quoted.<sup>38</sup> Elsewhere too (44.9-10)<sup>39</sup> he says that the infinitive lacks persons and numbers and modal distinction.

<sup>35</sup> Tense-signs are particularly striking because as a result of their parallelism in finite forms on the one hand, and in participles and infinitives on the other, their correspondences throughout the whole verbal system are so easily recognizable. Cf. Apollonius 322.8-12: Δύναται γὰρ κατὰ χρόνον τὸ ἐπίρρημα ἀποτελείσθαι, καθὸ ἔστιν ἐπινοήσαι καπὶ τῶν μετοχῶν, εἶγε τῷ μὲν γράφω ἡ γράφων παράκειται, τῷ δὲ ἔγραψα ἡ γράψας. τῷ γὰρ αὐτῷ λόγῳ καὶ τῷ γράφω τὸ γράφειν παρακίεσται, τῷ τε ἔγραψα τὸ γράψαι.

<sup>36</sup> Cf. below, note 79.

<sup>37</sup> Φησὶ δὲ πάλιν προσώπων τε καὶ ἀριθμῶν εἶναι αὐτὸ παραστατικόν, καὶ οὐκ αἰεὶ, ἀλλ' ὅτε καὶ τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς διαθέσεις δηλοῖ, ὃ ἔστι τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς βουλήσεις, ἵνα περιλάβῃ καὶ τὰ ἀπαρέμφата.

<sup>38</sup> See notes 6 and 33.

<sup>39</sup> ἔλλειπει προσώποις καὶ ἀριθμοῖς καὶ ἔτι ψυχικῇ διαθέσει.

In regard to the participle, often grouped with the infinitive, Apollonius defines its lacks as follows: the properties (namely, modal distinction, numbers, and persons) already enumerated as belonging to verbs (321.1);<sup>40</sup> “distinction of person” and “modal notion” (292.11–2);<sup>41</sup> division into persons and the accompanying modal distinctions (432.15–6).<sup>42</sup>

Involved in these points is a specially difficult feature of Apollonius' views on verbs. Obviously, the possession of person, number, and mood is not essential to a verb, since the infinitive, lacking all of them, is still a verb. On the other hand, the possession of tense and voice does not of itself constitute all the essential qualities that make up a verb, since of the two forms, the infinitive and the participle, which, while lacking person and mood, do possess tense and voice, the infinitive *is* a verb and the participle *is not* a verb.

The following seems to be Apollonius' line of reasoning.

He first shows that number, person, and mood are not the essential features of a verb.

Number of itself is not an inherent part of the verb, for the action is a single unit; it belongs rather to the (person or) persons participating in the action (324.11–325.3).<sup>43</sup> He unquestionably has in mind the fact that the infinitive itself is a singular noun. He may perhaps also mean that if a number of people perform an action jointly (such as singing), the situation involves only one action, but several people. If so, he is really groping after the idea that the verb merely *agrees* with its subject in number, though he does not explicitly say so. Some might argue that, if *each* person sings, there really are a number of acts of singing;<sup>44</sup> but none the less the *act* of singing is singular.

<sup>40</sup> Quoted above, in note 33. The reference not only to person and mood but also to number as something lacked by participles is of course a slip, of which Apollonius is not guilty elsewhere.

<sup>41</sup> ἀφαιρείται δ' αὖ τὴν προσώπου διάκρισιν καὶ ψυχικὴν ἔννοιαν.

<sup>42</sup> κἂν ἀποβάλωσι τὸν τῶν προσώπων μερισμὸν τὰς τε παρεπομένας ψυχικὰς διαθέσεις τοῖς ῥήμασιν.

<sup>43</sup> ἀναγκᾶς λείπουσα τοῖς προδιαπορηθείσι, <τοῖς προσώποις καὶ> τῷ παρεπομένῳ ἀριθμῷ, ὃς οὐ φύσει παρέπεται τῷ ῥήματι, παρακολούθημα δὲ γίνεται προσώπων τῶν μετεilhφότων τοῦ πράγματος. αὐτὸ γὰρ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἐν ἔστιν, τὸ γράφειν, τὸ περιπατεῖν· ὅπερ ἐγγινώμενον ἐν προσώποις ποιεῖ τὸ περιπατῶ, τὸ περιπατοῦμεν, τὸ περιπατοῦσιν.

<sup>44</sup> Thus in Hittite, in which iterative-durative verbs are distinguished morphologically, by an element *-sk-*, from simple verbs, the *-sk-* form is used not only to show that a single person performs an act repeatedly, for instance that wherever he goes

Person of itself is not an inherent part of the verb, for a verb can refer to all persons (325.4-8)<sup>45</sup> as to all numbers. It is the persons participating in the action who are in the various persons<sup>46</sup> (he uses the word *prosôpa* here in two slightly different senses). Here again he must be thinking of the agreement of the verb with its subject; of course the matter of person is very closely tied up in verbs with that of number. Evidently he does not view the personal endings as an essential part of the verb. Or he may have in mind that the infinitive can be used with a subject of any person (and number); this is less likely, however, since, as is demonstrated by Skrzeczka (3.19-20), he fails to realize that an infinitive can take a subject. At all events, he certainly holds that an infinitive is a verb even though it lacks person (and number); hence person (and number) are not integral parts of a verb. This, to be sure, involves circular reasoning; a verb by definition has person and number so long as it has mood, but when it does not have mood —

he conquers, but also to show that a large number of persons each perform a single action, for instance that in a plague a great many people die; the dying takes place repeatedly or continually, though each person dies only once.

<sup>45</sup> Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐκείνο ἀληθεύσει, ὡς τὸ ῥῆμα δεκτικόν ἐστιν προσώπων· πάλιν γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ παρεπομένου τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐπεγένετο. τὰ γὰρ μετεληφότα πρόσωπα τοῦ πράγματος εἰς πρόσωπα ἀνεμερίσθη, περιπατῶ, περιπατεῖς, περιπατεῖ· αὐτὸ γε μὴν ἐκτὸς ὃν προσώπων καὶ ἀριθμῶν συμφέρεται ἅπασιν ἀριθμοῖς καὶ ἅπασι προσώποις.

<sup>46</sup> Apollonius holds that, whereas pronouns may be in the first, second, or third person, nouns are in the third person only, and therefore can be used with verbs in the third person only; see 20.6-21.3, and 154-60 *passim*, especially 154.9-10, 156.8-10, 158.7-9, 159.10-1. (He recognizes just one exception, the use of a noun with "I am" or "I am called," but here he is getting into difficulty because he confuses subject and predicate nominative; see 159.13-160.11.) Actually, person belongs to the verb and *not* to the subject. The only substantives that vary in form for person, and that therefore may be said to possess this attribute, are the personal pronouns. The noun *can* be used as the subject of a verb in the first or second person (a phenomenon fairly common in Hittite, though rare in Greek and Latin); as an example we may cite Thucydides 1.137.4 Θεμιστοκλῆς ἤκω παρὰ σέ (cf. Schwyzler 2.246). Apollonius, however, expressly denies this possibility; he declares (159.8-12) that we must say not 'Ἀπολλώνιος γράφω but 'Ἀπολλώνιος γράφει. (Cf. Egger's excellent comment, 80-1, that, whereas French in official phraseology uses such locutions as *je soussigné, nous préfet*, etc., in Greek or Latin when the name of an author or the designation of an official group serves as subject, the verb is regularly in the third person; he might also have cited the superscription of a letter.) At all events, Apollonius' viewpoint can be defended insofar as it is true that the relationship to the speaker of the individual or group serving as subject of the verb determines the person of the verb. Also, the question arises what we are to say about both the person and the number of a verb which has no subject at all; but Apollonius would probably maintain that even when no subject is expressed, we still have "persons participating in the action" (325.1, 5-6, and 9-10; see notes 43, 45, and 48).

i.e., when it is an infinitive — and therefore lacks person and number as well, it still is a verb. Why then include these items at all in the definition?<sup>47</sup>

And finally the verb does not of itself possess the distinction of mood; for once more it is the persons participating in the action that express through the verb the distinction involved in themselves (the persons), but those verbs (i.e., infinitives) that lack persons do not express the distinction of mood that is involved in them (the persons) (325.8–12).<sup>48</sup> This seems to me extraordinarily weak.<sup>49</sup> Apollonius having set out with the premise that the distinction of mood is intimately connected with the distinction of person and number, and that any form lacking one must therefore necessarily lack the other, and having just shown that the person and number of a verb are determined by its subject, now has to conclude that the same is true of its mood. I readily admit that the subject, through its own possession of person (at least from Apollonius' point of view; cf. note 46) and of number, certainly has a bearing on the person and number of the verb, since the latter agrees with it; but the subject does not possess mood, and I cannot see that it has any more bearing on the mood of the verb than on its tense and voice. Once more, I think Apollonius' reasoning is circular. It is true that verb-forms lacking person also lack modal distinction, but this is *not* because the subject influences the mood as well as the person of the verb.

It may be, and indeed it has been, argued that here the *psychikê diathesis* possessed by the persons participating in the action of the verb really is not mood, as I have been insisting, but "attitude of mind," which only persons can possess and which they manifest through the verb. Thus Skrzeczka (2.4) quotes the passage just cited (in note 48) as far as the first *homologeî* as one of the pieces of evidence on which he bases his statement (2.3) that *psychikê diathesis* is used by Apollonius "mit Bezug auf die Affektion der Seele des Subjects." How Skrzeczka can at one and the same time maintain (1) that *psychikê diathesis* is "Affektion der Seele" and (2) that this

<sup>47</sup> Cf. Heliodorus' comment (72.10–2), quoted above, in note 37.

<sup>48</sup> 'Αλλ' οὐδὲ ψυχικὴν διάθεσιν τὸ ῥῆμα ἐπιδέχεται. πάλιν γὰρ τὰ μετεληφόμενα τῶν πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα τὴν ἐν αὐτοῖς διάθεσιν ὁμολογεῖ διὰ τοῦ ῥήματος. τὰ δέ, ὡς οὐκέτι ἐγγενόμενα ἐν προσώποις, οὐδὲ τὸ ἐν τούτοις ἐπιγενόμενον ἐνδιάθετον τῆς ψυχῆς ὁμολογεῖ.

<sup>49</sup> It is tied up with another weak point, his determination to prove that the infinitive is a verb, even though the participle is not. On this see below, p. 42.

"Affektion" belongs to the *subject*, I cannot comprehend. I believe that "the persons participating in the action" which decide the person and the number of the verb do indeed do so because they serve as the subject of the verb; but the mood of the verb, at least so far as the imperative and the optative go, depends on the "attitude of mind" — if we choose to express ourselves in these terms — not necessarily of the *subject* but of the *speaker*. Thus the passage just studied actually constitutes an argument against rather than for the belief that *psychikê diathesis* in Apollonius is "attitude of mind" or something of the sort.

Since person, number, and mood have been shown, at least to Apollonius' satisfaction, not to be true qualities of the verb, we must conclude that the peculiar property of verbs is to express tense and voice (325.12–4).<sup>50</sup> These it may be noted are in no way connected with the subject, as person and number clearly are, and as Apollonius has tried not very successfully to show that mood is. Hence the infinitive, though it lacks person, number, and *psychikê diathesis*, is none the less to be considered as one of the *enkliseis*.<sup>51</sup>

Why not, then, the participle also? There is a real inconsistency here, which seems to trouble even Egger, a profound admirer of Apollonius (168). Being on the whole a logical person, Apollonius cannot fail to recognize this discrepancy; and he admits (320.3)<sup>52</sup> that there is some basis for the arguments of those who point out (1) that the infinitive lacks *psychikê diathesis*, number, and person, just as does the participle, which is in consequence excluded from the category of verbs (320.4–321.2),<sup>53</sup> and (2) as a corollary to the foregoing, that the possession of tense and the accompanying *diathesis*<sup>54</sup> does not justify classing infinitives as verbs, since participles also possess these attributes, and participles are not verbs (321.2–5).<sup>55</sup>

<sup>50</sup> "Ἴδιον οὖν ῥηματός ἐστιν ἐν ἰδίοις μετασχηματισμοῖς διάφορος χρόνος διάθεσις τε ἡ ἐνεργητική καὶ παθητική καὶ ἔτι ἡ μέση.

<sup>51</sup> Cf. above, note 6.

<sup>52</sup> Καὶ εἴη ἂν τὰ συνηγοροῦντα τῷ λόγῳ τοιαῦτα.

<sup>53</sup> This statement, with which Apollonius is in full accord, was quoted above (note 33) to illustrate the connection of *psychikê diathesis* with person and number, all being possessed by verbs and all being lacked by infinitives and participles (for the correction needed in regard to participles, see note 40).

<sup>54</sup> Here the context clearly justifies our interpreting *diathesis* as "voice." Cf. above, note 22.

<sup>55</sup> Οὐ γὰρ δὴ γε ὁ μετασχηματισμὸς τοῦ χρόνου ἐν τῷ γράφειν ἢ γράψαι καὶ ἔτι ἡ συνοῦσα διάθεσις συνάξει τὸ ῥήματα αὐτὰ πάντως καλεῖσθαι, ἐπεὶ ταῦτόν σύνεστι τῇ μετοχῇ καὶ οὐ ῥήματα αἱ μετοχαί.

But Apollonius evidently thinks that he has satisfactorily solved the problem by pointing out another characteristic of the infinitive: it is, he says (324.10),<sup>56</sup> the most general form of the verb (cf. also 325.14–326.1<sup>57</sup>). Certainly this does apply to the infinitive and does not apply to the participle. But the detail that he adds as proof of this seems to me by no means convincing. He says that every derived word can be resolved into the primitive word and a second word equivalent in meaning to the suffix (326.11–327.1),<sup>58</sup> and thus any finite form of the verb can be resolved into an infinitive plus a verb expressing by its meaning the force of the mood (327.7–12).<sup>59</sup> This latter argument seems to me to fail signally in fulfilling Apollonius' purpose of including the infinitive as a verb and excluding the participle, since we could similarly form a periphrastic substitute for any finite verb by a combination of the appropriate participle plus an auxiliary — “be” or in some cases “have” — expressing by its meaning the force of the tense. Thus by reasoning similar to Apollonius', *luô* could be equated with *luôn eimi*, *leluka* with *lelukôs eimi* or with *lelukôs* (or, as was done, perhaps less logically but more frequently, with *lusas*) *echô*, *luômai* with *luomenos ô* (the regular type with consonant stems, as *tetrimmenos ô*), etc.

So far as concerns my thesis in regard to Apollonius' use of *psychikê diathesis* as meaning “distinction of mood,” the essential point in all the passages just quoted is that in them all the phrase in question is made completely parallel with *prosôpon* “person” and *arithmos* “number.” All the words concerned are terms common enough in ordinary speech; but in the passages from Apollonius they are all used in a technical sense, and *psychê* (as implied by *psychikê*) is no more to be interpreted as “mind” or “soul” than *prosôpon* is to be interpreted as “face.”<sup>60</sup> If it is asked why Apol-

<sup>56</sup> ἔστιν γενικωτάτῃ ἢ τῶν ἀπαρεμφάτων ἔγκλισις.

<sup>57</sup> τὸ γενικώτατον ῥῆμα, λέγω τὸ ἀπαρέμφατον.

<sup>58</sup> Καθόλου πᾶν παρηγμένον ἀπὸ τινος ἀνάλυσιν ἔχει τὴν πρὸς τὸ πρωτότυπον μετὰ λέξεως τῆς σημαινούσης ταῦτόν τῃ παραγωγῇ.

<sup>59</sup> Καὶ δὴ πᾶσα ἔγκλισις οὐκ εἰς ἄλλο τι μεταλαμβάνεται ἢ εἰς ἀπαρέμφατον μετὰ λέξεως τῆς σημαινούσης ταῦτόν τῃ ἔγκλισι, ὅτε οὕτως φασί, περιπατῶ — ὠρισμένην περιπατεῖν, περιπατοῦμι — ἡϋξάμην περιπατεῖν, περιπάτει — προσέταξα περιπατεῖν. Πῶς οὖν οὐ βίαιον τὸ τὰ συνεκτικώτατα τῶν ἀπάντων ῥημάτων περιγράφειν τῆς τῶν ῥημάτων ἐννοίας;

(The last sentence of the foregoing was already quoted in another connection, above, note 7.)

<sup>60</sup> Of course this does not mean that Apollonius is debarred from ever using *psychikê* and *psychikôs* in the ordinary sense of “mental” and “mentally”; indeed,

lonius chose *psychikê* "mental" for that particular use, it can only be said that to answer that question we would have to know something about Apollonius' own "attitude of mind" in the literal sense! But it may be noted that as a parallel to the grammatical terms for "person" and "number" we find not only *psychikê diathesis* but also its partial synonym,<sup>61</sup> *enkklisis*, as in 283.1–3.<sup>62</sup> In such a case, it would be no more absurd to translate *enkklisis* "slope" instead of "mood" than it is to translate *psychikê diathesis* "distinction of the soul (or mind)" instead of "distinction of mood."

But when we come to the group of later grammarians who produced commentaries, catechisms, or epitomes based on the earlier works, and whose value lies rather in the information that we can deduce from them about lost writings of their predecessors than in any original contribution of their own, we have an entirely different state of affairs. Now *psychê* is no longer a technical grammatical term meaning "mood," but a mentalistically used expression implying a conscious guiding power behind the mood, to wit the soul or mind.

So far as the material at our disposal enables us to judge, it was Choeroboscus, who probably belongs to the latter part of the sixth century, that set the unfortunate model for scholars down to our own day by the psychological twist that he gave to Apollonius' straightforward linguistic discussions. Thus the word *enkklisis*, which, as already explained,<sup>63</sup> in Apollonius simply meant a deviation from a *Grundform*, is given a wholly distorted definition by Choeroboscus (5.1–3),<sup>64</sup> "the preference (*proairesis*) of the mind, that is, that toward which the mind is inclined" — after which (3–4)<sup>65</sup> he enumerates actions obviously corresponding to the four<sup>66</sup> *enkkliseis*

examples of this very usage have been cited above, notes 28, 30, 31, and 32. In the same way, *prosôpon* is not restricted to "grammatical person"; it can also mean "person" in the sense of "individual," as in the passages cited in notes 43, 45, and 48, the second of which (325.4–8) is particularly interesting because here the word occurs twice over, in the two different senses, as we have already noted.

<sup>61</sup> Their differences have already been discussed; for passages illustrative thereof, see notes 5 and 6.

<sup>62</sup> ἡ γὰρ τοῦ ἐπιρρήματος σύνδοδος, οὐ δεκτικὴ οὐσα τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἢ τῶν προσώπων ἢ τῶν ἐγκλίσεων καὶ ἔτι τῶν χρόνων ὧν τὸ ῥῆμα παραδέχεται.

<sup>63</sup> See above, note 9.

<sup>64</sup> Ἐγκλisis γὰρ ἡ ψυχικὴ προαίρεσις, τουτέστι καθ' ὃ ἐγκλίνεται ἡ ψυχὴ, ἡγουν εἰς ὃ ῥέπει ἡ ψυχὴ.

<sup>65</sup> Ἐγκλίνει γὰρ καὶ ῥέπει ἢ εἰς τὸ ὀρίσαι ἢ εἰς τὸ προστάξει ἢ εἰς τὸ εὖξασθαι ἢ <εἰς τὸ > διστάσαι.

<sup>66</sup> The infinitive is excluded. Cf. above, note 11.



or moods as the goals toward which the mind “inclines.” For “incline” he uses interchangeably *enklinetai* and *enklinei* (a sort of play-on-words in Greek as in English), adding expegetically to each its synonym *rhepei*. Again the attribute possessed by verbs but not by infinitives, *diathesis psychês*, which to Apollonius (in the form *psychikê diathesis*) was simply “modal distinction,” as I trust I have adequately demonstrated, he explains twice over (4.21–2<sup>67</sup> concerning verbs, and 4.23<sup>68</sup> concerning infinitives) as *proairesis*; almost directly afterwards (4.24–6)<sup>69</sup> he uses *psychês proairesis* and *thelêma psychês* as synonyms; and later on, in a more detailed discussion of infinitives (7.20–3),<sup>70</sup> he repeats the latter phrase as denoting something that cannot exist without persons. It should perhaps be noted here that Apollonius does use the term *psychês proairesis*, but in a wholly different way; in a discussion of verbs (such as *thelô* and *boulomai*) that take a complementary infinitive, he describes these verbs as denoting “a preference of the mind” rather than the actual performance of an action (324.1).<sup>71</sup> But this of course in no way justifies Choeroboscus in substituting *psychês proairesis* or *thelêma psychês*<sup>72</sup> for Apollonius’ *psychikê diathesis* as something parallel to *prosôpon* that verbs possess<sup>73</sup> and infinitives lack.<sup>74</sup>

The same sort of gratuitous change appears in Choeroboscus’ successor Sophronius, who perhaps produced a shortened edition of Choeroboscus. Sophronius (409.25–7<sup>75</sup> and 411.26–8<sup>76</sup>) repeats Choeroboscus’ apparently erroneous statement that the term *enklisis* is used for “mood” only by the *later* grammarians; but he

<sup>67</sup> διαθέσιν ψυχῆς ἔχουσιν, τουτέστι προαίρεσιν.

<sup>68</sup> οὐκ ἔχουσι διαθέσιν ψυχῆς, τουτέστι προαίρεσιν.

<sup>69</sup> Καλῶς οὖν πρόσκειται τῷ προσώπων σημαντικὰ τὰ ῥήματα τὸ ὅτε καὶ ψυχῆς προαίρεσιν ἔχουσιν, ὅτε γὰρ μὴ ἔχουσι θέλημα ψυχῆς, οὔτε πρόσωπα ἔχουσιν.

<sup>70</sup> Προσώπων δὲ μὴ ὄντων εἰκότως οὐδὲ θέλημα ψυχῆς δύναται εἶναι· πῶς γὰρ δύναται εἶναι θέλημα ψυχῆς ἄνευ προσώπων; τὸ γὰρ μὴ ὄν πῶς ἔχει θελήσαι; εἰκότως οὖν οὔτε θέλημα ψυχῆς ἔχουσι τὰ ἀπαρέμφата.

<sup>71</sup> αὐτὸ μόνον προαίρεσιν ψυχῆς ὀρίζεται, ἐλλείποντα τῷ πράγματι.

<sup>72</sup> See notes 67, 68, 69, and 70.

<sup>73</sup> See note 33.

<sup>74</sup> See notes 33 and 39.

<sup>75</sup> Ἐγκλίσεις τοῖνυν καλοῦσιν οἱ νεώτεροι τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς βουλήσεις, ὡς ἀπὸ πράγματος εἰς πρᾶγμα τὴν οἰονεὶ κλίσιν τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ ῥοπὴν σημαινούσας.

<sup>76</sup> Ἄνω εἰρήκαμεν, ὅτι ἐγκλίσεις καλοῦσιν οἱ νεώτεροι τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς βουλήσεις, ἐπειδὴ οἱ παλαιοὶ τεχνικοὶ ταύτας καὶ τὰς διὰ τοῦ σώματος πράξεις διαθέσεις ὁμωνύμως ἐκάλουν.

gives as an explanatory or alternative expression for *enklisis* not *psychikê* (*diathesis*) as does Choeroboscus,<sup>77</sup> but *psychês boulêsis*.

Similarly Heliodorus, one of the scholiasts on Dionysius Thrax, injects *psychês boulêsis*<sup>78</sup> by way of exegesis for *psychês diathesis*, into what purports to be a citation of Apollonius (72.11–2<sup>79</sup> and 28–9<sup>80</sup>), just as Choeroboscus has inserted *proairesis*.<sup>81</sup> There is certainly nothing in any extant portion of Apollonius that would justify the addition of *boulêsis* (any more than *proairesis*) as an equivalent or explanation of *diathesis*.

We find both *thelêma* (and also *thelêsis*) and *boulêsis* (and also *boulêma*) in a late writer who may be cited as the ultimate in mentalism. This is the pseudo-Theodosius, probably in reality Theodorus Prodromus or Ptochoprodromus.<sup>82</sup> According to Skrzeczka (3.7),<sup>83</sup> Theodorus, or, as he calls him, Theodosius, defines *enklisis* (139.20 ff.)<sup>84</sup> as “the expression of the will or purpose (*boulêma*) of the mind”; and he, after the manner of Choeroboscus,<sup>85</sup> recognizes four main *boulêmata tês psychês* — the mind wants (*bouletai*) to make true or false statements, to order, to wish, etc.<sup>86</sup> — obviously corresponding to the four *enkliseis*, or, as he calls them, *boulêseis*. Again (139.30

<sup>77</sup> See note 13.

<sup>78</sup> The variant reading *kinêseis*, adopted by Bekker (*An.* 3.883.4), rather than *boulêseis*, adopted by Hilgard (72.12), seems much less likely.

<sup>79</sup> Already quoted in note 37, in connection with a portion of the text in which I was endeavoring to use Heliodorus to find out what Apollonius really said, not (as here) what he did not say.

<sup>80</sup> τὸ ἀπαρέμφατον οὐ δημοῖ ψυχικὴν διάθεσιν, ὃ ἐστὶ ψυχῆς βούλησιν.

<sup>81</sup> See notes 67 and 68.

<sup>82</sup> His writings were included by Goettling in his edition of Theodosius (cf. above, note 1), but later scholars have demonstrated the incorrectness of the attribution. See above all Uhlig's edition of Dionysius Thrax (*GG* Part 1) XXXVI–VII; also Hilgard's edition of the Scholia on Dionysius (*GG* Part 3) XLIII, and the Prolegomena to his edition of Theodosius' *Canones* (*GG* Part 4, Vol. 2) CXXVII. That this supposed Theodosius was a late and inferior writer had been recognized before the publication of Goettling's edition by Bekker, who calls him “nec gravem admodum neque antiquum, Theodosium nescio quem” (*Ap.* 351), and suggests his real identity as Theodorus (*An.* 3.1137, note).

<sup>83</sup> I am unfortunately obliged to depend on Skrzeczka's quotations from, and references to, the Goettling edition (see notes 1 and 82), since it is not accessible to me.

<sup>84</sup> Ἑγκλισίς μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ βουλῆματος ψυχῆς ἔμφασις· τὰ δὲ βουλήματα τῆς ψυχῆς κεφαλαιωδῶς εἰσι τέσσαρα· ἡ γὰρ ἀληθεύειν καὶ ψεύδεσθαι βούλεται ἡ ψυχὴ, καὶ λέγεται αὕτη ἡ βούλησις ὀρεστική ὡς ὀρίζουσα τὸ ψεῦδος καὶ ἀλήθειαν, ἢ προστάσσειν βούλεται, ἢ εὐχεσθαι (κτλ.).

<sup>85</sup> Cf. Choeroboscus 5.3–4, quoted in note 65.

<sup>86</sup> Skrzeczka unfortunately does not tell us how he designates the action corresponding to the subjunctive.

ff.)<sup>87</sup> he tells us that the tongue does not simply prattle at random on its own initiative, but reveals and reports the wishes (*thelêmata*) of the mind; and that the *enklisis* is so called because, as a result of its wish (*thelêsis*) for anything, the mind "is inclined" (*enklinetai* as in Choeroboscus<sup>88</sup>) or "is turned" (*trepetai*) in a certain direction.

This is perhaps an extreme case in the way of horrible examples. But when we turn from Greek to Latin, we find that even Priscian, who is closer in time to Apollonius than any of the Greek scholiasts quoted, and whose Latin grammar, as is well known, stems largely from Apollonius, sins at times in his adaptations of his master. His use of *inclinationes animi* as a definition for *modi* (421.17–8)<sup>89</sup> seems to be the result of a sort of contamination or telescoping of *diatheseis psychês* and *enkliseis*. In his statement (369.17)<sup>90</sup> that verbs have person and number when they have mood, and again in his statement (422.9–10)<sup>91</sup> that infinitives lack person, number, and mood, *affectus animi* for "mood"<sup>92</sup> seems the same sort of misinterpretation of Apollonius' *psychikê diathesis* as Choeroboscus' *thelêma psychês*.<sup>93</sup> But when he refers similarly to the lack of person and mood on the part of participles (552.18–20),<sup>94</sup> he renders Apollonius' *psychikai diatheseis* excellently in his phrase *absque discretionem . . . modorum*. Also his definition of the verb (369.1–2),<sup>95</sup> though somewhat inadequate in other ways, does justice to the

<sup>87</sup> Οὐ γὰρ ἀπλῶς ἡ γλῶσσα ἐξ αὐτῆς τὰ παρατυχόντα λαλεῖ, ἀλλὰ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς θελήματα διαφωτίζει καὶ εξαγγέλλει. ἐγκλισις δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον λέγεται, διότι περὶ ἐκάστου θέλησιν ἐγκλίνεται ἥτοι τρέπεται ἡ ψυχὴ.

<sup>88</sup> See note 64.

<sup>89</sup> Modi sunt diversae inclinationes animi, varios eius affectus demonstrantes.

<sup>90</sup> Quoted above in note 10. This is evidently based on Apollonius' definition of a verb as we know it from Heliodorus 71.24–7 (quoted above, in note 34).

<sup>91</sup> nec numeros nec personas nec affectus animi certos habent. This is evidently based on Apollonius 44.9–10 (quoted above, in note 39).

<sup>92</sup> The English word *mood*, akin to German *Mut*, comes very close in meaning to the Latin *affectus animi*, which may furnish the reason why it is so widely used as an equivalent for Latin *modus* rather than the etymologically called-for *mode*.

<sup>93</sup> Choeroboscus 4.25 (quoted in note 69) and 7.22 (quoted in note 70).

<sup>94</sup> Participium est igitur pars orationis, quae pro verbo accipitur, ex quo et derivatur naturaliter, genus et casum habens ad similitudinem nominis et accidentia verbo absque discretionem personarum et modorum. Priscian in his treatment of participles, at the outset of which he mentions Apollonius (548.6), is doubtless following the latter's treatise on participles, which we do not possess; but we may compare with the passage just cited Apollonius' statement in the *Syntax* (432.15–6, quoted in note 42) that the participle lacks *prosôpôn merismos* and *psychikai diatheseis*.

<sup>95</sup> Verbum est pars orationis cum temporibus et modis, sine casu, agendi vel patiendo significativum.

one attributed to Apollonius by Heliodorus<sup>96</sup> insofar as *tês psychês diatheseis* (which Heliodorus himself goes on so unfortunately to explain as *tês psychês boulêseis*<sup>97</sup>) is represented simply by *modis*.

That followers of Apollonius like Priscian, Choeroboscus, and Heliodorus should at times have misinterpreted or misrepresented him is not strange. Dionysius and, later, Apollonius were pioneers<sup>98</sup> who were creating a system of grammatical nomenclature; they had to take every-day words, usually of concrete meaning, and apply them in an abstract and technical sense;<sup>99</sup> and if at times their metaphors were not understood, and their grammatical terms were given connotations that they were not supposed to possess, this is hardly surprising. But we of today should be more discerning, precisely because we are so much more remote and so much better-informed than were the early adaptors and commentators; and we should not interject fancy philosophical or psychological notions of mind or soul into the dry and objective statements of one whose style may have won him his cognomen of *Dyscolus* or "crabbed" precisely because it was so free from the extraneous ornamentation of any such metaphorical or metaphysical trappings.

<sup>96</sup> Heliodorus 71.24-7 (quoted in note 34; cf. note 90).

<sup>97</sup> Heliodorus 72.11-2 (quoted in note 37; cf. note 79).

<sup>98</sup> This is something of which we should not lose sight in evaluating Apollonius. It seems to me that no one who studies his writings can fail to be struck by the curious mixture of the subtle and the puerile which they present; but he deserves more credit for the subtle than blame for the puerile. It must be remembered, as I have just said, that he often had to act as a pioneer, blazing new trails; also that when he did follow a path already trod by his forerunners, they frequently proved faulty leaders who had left behind not helpful guide-posts but road-blocks which had to be cleared away, so that many of his discussions of points that seem to us too absurd to be worth treating are really necessary in order that he may refute the errors of his predecessors.

<sup>99</sup> A scholar of today creating a system of scientific terminology has Greek to borrow from (and he uses it directly, not translating it into his native vocabulary, as the Romans generally did); but the Greeks had no such advantage!